“We are not planning to go to war with Europe. But if Europe wants to, and starts, we are ready right now.”
That statement from Russian President Vladimir Putin last December was a stark reminder: a direct conflict between Russia and NATO, which includes the UK, is no longer an unthinkable prospect.
While the UK would never fight alone, the unsettling reality is that modern warfare would reach British shores in seconds—not with explosions, but with silence.
A sudden loss of phone and internet signal could be the first sign, followed by frozen bank payments and disrupted food and fuel distribution. This is not mere speculation. Our society depends on a fragile network of undersea cables and satellites for data, energy, and finance—infrastructure already being scrutinized by Russian vessels like the Yantar. In a conflict, severing these lifelines would be a primary goal, crippling both military operations and civilian life long before a single soldier landed.
This vulnerability underscores a more profound question recently posed at a London conference: is the UK prepared for a long war?
The answer, according to analysts, is worrying. “There remains little evidence that the UK has a plan to fight a war lasting more than a few weeks,” says Hamish de Bretton-Gordon of the Royal United Services Institute (Rusi).
He points to limited medical capacity, slow reserve recruitment, and a force structure lacking the essential “depth”—the spare personnel, equipment, and logistics—to absorb losses and continue a protracted fight.
“The British plan for mass casualty outcomes appears to be based on not taking casualties,” he notes with characteristic understatement. “This could be considered an optimistic planning assumption.”
The era of assuming short, decisive conflicts is over. The challenge for Britain is no longer just how to win the first battle, but how to endure a long, grinding struggle where societal resilience and industrial staying power would be tested as severely as the armed forces themselves.
By James Kisoo
